Design and Implementation of a Direct/Indirect Hybrid Trust Model for Secure Authentication in a Mobile Ad Hoc Network by Amirtharaj, Immanuel et al.
Santa Clara University
Scholar Commons
Computer Engineering Senior Theses Engineering Senior Theses
6-11-2017
Design and Implementation of a Direct/Indirect
Hybrid Trust Model for Secure Authentication in a
Mobile Ad Hoc Network
Immanuel Amirtharaj
Santa Clara University, iamirtharaj@scu.edu
Eric Bonilla
Santa Clara University, ebonilla@scu.edu
Parker Newton
Santa Clara University, pnewton@scu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/cseng_senior
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Engineering Senior Theses at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Computer Engineering Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact rscroggin@scu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Amirtharaj, Immanuel; Bonilla, Eric; and Newton, Parker, "Design and Implementation of a Direct/Indirect Hybrid Trust Model for
Secure Authentication in a Mobile Ad Hoc Network" (2017). Computer Engineering Senior Theses. 78.
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/cseng_senior/78

Design and Implementation of a Direct/Indirect Hybrid






Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degrees of
Bachelor of Science in Computer Science and Engineering
Bachelor of Science in Web Design and Engineering





Design and Implementation of a Direct/Indirect Hybrid









We investigated the problem of cryptographic key authentication in a mobile ad hoc network
(MANET). Using the theory of digital trust, we propose an authentication scheme for MANETs
that includes a hybrid trust model between the direct and indirect approaches. Our hybrid trust
model supplies trust data to a decentralized web of trust in order to authenticate nodes in a MANET.
We ran some simulations of our authentication scheme to verify its security and investigate potential
trust threshold values. Also, we designed and implemented a proof-of-concept iOS application that
implements our authentication scheme. Some future work includes investing several implications
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Many modern technologies such as Bitcoin, Spotify, and various file-sharing services are based on a
distributed network architecture. A distributed network is a network that partitions jobs among the
nodes. Specifically, a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a type of distributed network that contains
small-scale personal computers and embedded systems. A chief cryptographic concern in the design
of MANETs is the ad hoc authentication of the nodes. In this context, by the authentication of nodes
in a MANET, we mean key authentication without a centralized certificate authority. We propose
introducing the concept of digital trust to authentication in a distributed system. By building on
past work in the area of trust theory, we designed an authentication scheme that implements a
direct/indirect hybrid trust model to supply trust data to a web of trust.
An existing solution is the PGP web of trust scheme. However, PGP implements a system
of qualitative trust levels. By providing a system of quantitative trust values established through
algorithms that conform to basic axioms of trust theory, our solution o↵ers trust management with
increased granularity and accuracy. Our authentication scheme also addresses several attacks on
MANETs, including the Sybil and Newcomer attacks.
Our project consists of theoretical research, simulations, and software design and implementation.
We designed and implemented a proof-of-concept mobile iOS application that demonstrates our
authentication scheme. The mobile application reads mocked network data from a web back-end
component, and attempts to authenticate and send a message containing a string to another node.
A web front-end component displays a visualization of the mocked network web of trust graph.
Chapter 2 introduces the background of public key cryptography, the theory of groups, rings,
fields, and elliptic curves, several prominent public key cryptosystems we use in our project, and
webs of trust. Chapter 3 addresses current innovations in digital trust theory. Chapters 4 and 5
address our contributions of our project and the results we collected. Chapter 6 discusses the software
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design and architecture of our iOS and web proof-of-concept application. We address several societal






2.1 Introduction to Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography is a major area of cryptography that has many applications to topics such
as symmetric key agreement and authentication. This paper assumes the reader is familiar with the
concepts of symmetric key cryptography and hash algorithms.
Definition 2.1. Public key cryptography is a form of cryptography in which each user has their
own set of public and private keys.
Definition 2.2. A public key is a cryptographic key that is published. A private key is a crypto-
graphic key that is secret and known only by the user to which it belongs. We say that such a user
is the holder of the public and private keys.
Axiom 2.3. Let A be an entity. Then, the holder of A’s private key is A.
This axiom may seem trivial, but nonetheless is an underlying principle of cryptography. Often,
we discuss verifying that the holder of A’s public key is indeed the holder of A’s private key. But,
how do we know that the only holder of A’s private key is in fact A? We assume that is the case;
otherwise, many of our results in cryptography would also not hold. Non-repudiation is an area of
cryptography which addresses the scenario of some user purposefully leaking his or her private key
in order to claim fraud and nullify a legally binding document. Now, we will discuss the concept of
symmetric key agreement.
Definition 2.4. Let A and B be two entities that wish to exchange cipher text encrypted with a
symmetric key cryptosystem. The process of A and B determining the same symmetric key on-
demand and without having to be in the same location is called symmetric key agreement.
There are two important factors to address with symmetric key agreement. The first is the
on-demand agreement on a symmetric key. Historically, a symmetric key had to be agreed on by
two entities before the communication could be transmitted. However, the correct application of
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symmetric key agreement ensures that there does not need to be a previous communication between
the two entities. That is, the symmetric key agreement occurs ad hoc, or on-demand. The second
factor is that with public key cryptography, the two entities do not even have to be in the same
location to agree on a symmetric key.
Let A and B be two entities that wish to agree on a symmetric key. The general process is that
A will compute a symmetric key, and then encrypt the symmetric key with B’s public key. So, now
only B can decrypt the encrypted message, because the message can only be decrypted with B’s
private key.
Now that the two entities have successfully agreed on a symmetric key and exchanged encrypted
messages, we consider the problem of verifying the authenticity of the messages and the identities
of the users.
Definition 2.5. Let A and B be two entities, and suppose A sends an encrypted message to B.
The process of B verifying that the message originated from the holder of A’s private key is called
message authentication. The process of B verifying that the holder of A’s public key is the same
entity as the holder of A’s private key is called key authentication.
Authentication is an extremely important concept in cryptography that provides secure commu-
nication. Correct authentication of messages ans users’ keys ensures that a malicious third party has
not not impersonated another user or forged public and private keys. The authenticity of messages
and users’ keys are verified with a mechanism called a digital signature.
Definition 2.6. A digital signature is a cryptographic mechanism that is used to verify that a
message originated from some entity.
Let A and B be two entities, and suppose A encrypts a message for B. A computes a hash of
the message, and encrypts the resulting value with A’s private key. B then independently computes
a hash of the decrypted message, and then decrypts the digital signature with A’s public key. B
compares the value of the hash to that of the decrypted digital signature, and if the two values are
equal, and since by axiom 2.3 only A could have encrypted the digital signature, then B is assured
of the integrity and authenticity of the message.
The next natural extension of the concept of authentication addresses how public and private
keys are created and managed. A user’s public keys are published in a document called a certificate.
Definition 2.7. A certificate is a document that associates a set of public keys with a set of private
keys.
In centralized network architecture, a certificate is issued by a trusted authority called a certificate
authority (CA). The CA creates the public and private keys for that user, and then encrypts a hash of
the document with the CA’s private key. The resulting signature is then published on the certificate.
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Let A and B be entities, and C be a CA. Suppose C creates a certificate for A, and that some user B
wishes to verify the authenticity of A’s certificate. B decrypts the digital signature with C’s public
key, and then computes the hash of the document. B then compares the value of the decrypted
digital signature to that of the hash. If the values are equal, then B is assured of the integrity and
authenticity of A’s certificate. Because the certificate originated from C, a trusted CA, then B is
assured that the holder of A’s private key is the holder of A’s public key. By axiom 2.3, B is assured
that A is the holder of A’s public key.
The theoretical background of public key cryptography algorithms involves a great deal of ab-
stract algebra and number theory. Specifically, group theory, ring theory, field theory, and Galois
theory are several areas of abstract algebra with numerous applications to public key cryptography.
2.2 Introduction to Group Theory
Group theory is an area of abstract algebra that includes the study of the algebraic structure of
groups and results that generalize properties of groups. Group theory can be applied to study many
objects in mathematics. Many of these objects form the theoretical basis of public key cryptography.
In this section, we will present a brief overview of some introductory group theory material with few
proofs. The following group, ring, and field theory results are presented in Judson [4] and Long [5].
Definition 2.8. A group is a set G and a binary operation ⇤ : G⇥G ! G defined on G with the
following properties:
1. 9 e 2 G such that 8g 2 G, g ⇤ e = e ⇤ g = g. We say that e is the identity element of G.
2. 8g 2 G, 9 g 1 2 G such that g ⇤ g 1 = g 1 ⇤ g = e. We say that g 1 is the inverse element
of g in G.
3. ⇤ is associative.
We say that G is a group under ⇤.
If G is an abstract group, then we simply denote the binary operation ⇤ defined on G by mul-
tiplication. An immediate consequence of the definition of the binary operation on G is that
8g, g0 2 G, gg0 2 G. We say that G is closed under the binary operation. Z, Q, R, Zn =
{0, 1, . . . , n  1}, any ring A, any field K, and the set of n⇥ n matrices with entries in some field K
(denoted Mat(n,K)) are all groups under addition. Q\{0}, R\{0}, Zp \{0} for some prime integer
p, K \{0} for some field K, and the set of invertible n⇥n matrices with entries in some field K (de-
noted GL(n,K)) are all groups under multiplication. The set of permutations of the set {1, 2, . . . , n}
(denoted Sn, the symmetric group), the set of even permutations of the set {1, 2, . . . , n} (denoted
An, the alternating group), the set of isometries of a regular n-gon (denoted Dn, the dihedral group),
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the set of rotations of a regular cube, the set of automorphisms of some field K (denoted Aut(K)),
and the set of automorphisms of a normal extension field L of K extending the identity map of K
(denoted G(L/K), the Galois group of L over K) are all groups under function composition.
Definition 2.9. Let G be a group. We say the cardinality of G, denoted |G|, is the order of G.
Definition 2.10. Let G be a group, and H ✓ G. If H is a group, then we say H is a subgroup of
G. We write H  G.
Definition 2.11. Let G be a group, and a 2 G. We say that the set hai = {..., a 3, a 2, a 1, a0 =
e, a, a2, a3, ...} = {am : m 2 Z 0} is the subgroup of G generated by a.
Definition 2.12. Let G be a group. If 9 a 2 G such that G = hai, then we say that G is a cyclic
group. We also say that a is a generator of G.
Proposition 2.13. Let G be a group, H  G, and ⇠: G⇥G by a ⇠ b i↵ b 1a 2 H be a relation
of G. Then, ⇠ is an equivalence relation of G.
Proof. Let a, b, c 2 G. a 1a = e 2 H, by definition, and so a ⇠ a.





Since h 1 2 H, then b ⇠ a.
Now, suppose a ⇠ b and b ⇠ c. Then, b 1a 2 H and c 1b 2 H. So, 9 h1, h2 2 H such that
b 1a = h1 and c 1b = h2. We have
c 1b = h2
b = ch2







Since h2h1 2 H, then a ⇠ c.
We have shown that ⇠ is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive, and hence ⇠ is an equivalence relation.
⌅
Let G be a group, and a 2 G. By proposition 2.13, a ⇠ b i↵ b 1a 2 H is an equivalence
relation of G. Consider the equivalence class [a] under ⇠. Then, [a] = {b 2 G : a 1b 2 H}.
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Definition 2.14. Let G be a group, H  G, and a 2 G. We say the set aH = {ah : h 2 H} is
a left coset of H in G. Similarly, we say the set Ha = {ha : h 2 H} is a right coset of H in G.
Proposition 2.15. Let G be a group, H  G, and a, b 2 G. Then, a 2 bH i↵ b 1a 2 H.
Proof. Suppose a 2 bH. Then, 9 bh 2 H, h 2 H, such that a = bh. We have
a = bh
b 1a = h.
Since h 2 H, then b 1a 2 H.
Conversely, suppose b 1a 2 H. Then, 9 h0 2 H such that b 1a = h0. We have
b 1a = h0
a = bh0.
Since h0 2 H, then a = bh0 2 bH. ⌅
Now, we have
[a] = {b 2 G : a 1b 2 H}
[a] = {b 2 G : b 2 aH}, by proposition 2.15
[a] = aH.
So, the equivalence classes of ⇠ are actually the left cosets of H in G.
Lemma 2.16. Let G be a group, and H  G. Then, the set {aH : a 2 G} partitions G.
Proof. Let ⇠: G ⇥ G by a ⇠ b i↵ b 1a 2 H be a relation of G. By proposition 2.13, ⇠ is an
equivalence relation of G. We know that the equivalence classes of G under ⇠ partition G. We
showed that the equivalence classes of G under ⇠ are the left cosets of H. Hence, {aH : a 2 G}
partitions G. ⌅
Lemma 2.17. Let G be a group, and H  G. Then, 8a 2 G, |aH| = |H|.
Proof. Consider some a 2 H, and define the map   : H ! aH by  (h) = ah. We will show that  
is a bijection, and hence |aH| = |H|.
Consider h, h0 2 H such that  (h) =  (h0). Then, we have
ah = ah0
h = h0, by left cancellation.
So,   is an injection.
Now, consider some ag 2 aH, g 2 H. Then, a 1ag = g 2 H. So,  (g) = ag, and so   is a
surjection.
We have shown that   is a bijection, and so the conclusion follows. ⌅
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Now, we will prove a marvelous result in group theory which is referred to as Lagrange’s Theorem.
Definition 2.18. Let a, b 2 Z such that a 6= 0. If 9 m 2 Z such that b = am, then we say that
a divides b. We write a | b.
Theorem 2.19. Let G be a finite group, and H  G. Then, |H| | |G|.



















Hence, m | n. ⌅
Corollary 2.20. Let G be a finite group, and a 2 G. Then, ord(a) | |G|.
Proof. By definition, ord(a) = |hai|. Since hai  G, then by Theorem 2.19, |hai| | |G|, and hence
ord(a) | |G|. ⌅
Definition 2.21. Let G be a group and H  G. If 8a 2 G, aH = Ha, then we say that H is a
normal subgroup of H. We write H /G.
Definition 2.22. Let G be a group, and H /G. Then, we say the set G/H = {aH : a 2 G} is the
quotient group of H in G.
2.3 Introduction to Ring Theory and Field Theory
Ring theory and field theory are two areas of abstract algebra that involve the study of the algebraic
structures of rings and fields, respectively. Much of the theory of fields is based on many important
results in ring theory. Additionally, field theory includes the study of many other important topics
such as field extensions, finite fields, separability, splitting fields, algebraic closures, field isomor-
phisms, embeddings, and automorphisms, and normal extensions. Field theory sets the theoretical
foundation for an extremely important area of abstract algebra called Galois theory. Galois theory
proves important results about normal extension fields, and connects field theory to group theory in
a very elegant and beautiful way. Ring theory, field theory, and Galois theory have many important
applications to public key cryptography. We will begin with a brief overview of the theory of rings
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and fields, and then discuss some important results about finite fields that will allow us to construct
several significant public key cryptosystems.
Definition 2.23. A ring is a set A with the binary operations of addition and multiplication defined
on A, and with the following properties:
1. 9 0 2 A such that 8a 2 A, a+ 0 = 0 + a = a. We say that 0 is the additive identity of A.
2. 9 1 2 A such that 8a 2 A, a · 1 = 1 · a = a. We say that 1 is the multiplicative identity of
A.
3. 8a 2 A, 9   a 2 A such that a + ( a) =  a + a = 0. We say that  a is the additive
inverse of A.
4. Addition and Multiplication are associative.
5. Addition is commutative.
6. Multiplication is distributive over addition.
Definition 2.24. Let A be a ring. If the multiplication is commutative, then we say that A is a
commutative ring.
Definition 2.25. Let A be a commutative ring, and I ✓ A. Then, we say I is an ideal of A if I
has the following properties:
1. 0 2 I.
2. 8a, b 2 I, a+ b 2 I.
3. 8a 2 I, 8m 2 A, ma 2 I.
Definition 2.26. Let A be a commutative ring and I be an ideal of A. If I is of the form (a) =
{ma : m 2 A}, for some a 2 I, then we say that I is a principal ideal.
Definition 2.27. Let A be a commutative ring and I be an ideal of A. We say that I is a maximal
ideal of A if for every ideal J of A such that I ✓ J ✓ A, then either I = J or J = A.
Definition 2.28. Let A be a commutative ring, a 2 A, and I be an ideal of A. Then, the set
a+ I = {a+ r : r 2 I} is a coset of I in A.
Definition 2.29. Let Let A be a commutative ring and I be an ideal of A. Then, the set A/I =
{a+ I : a 2 A} is the quotient ring of I in A.
It can be easily shown that the quotient ring A/I is in fact a ring.
Definition 2.30. Let A be a commutative ring and a, b 2 A. If 9 m 2 A such that b = am, then
we say that a divides b. We write a|b.
Definition 2.31. Let A be a commutative ring and a 2 A. If a|1, then we say that a is a unit.
We denote the subset of units of a commutative ring A by A⇤. It can be easily shown that A⇤ is
a group under multiplication, and so we call A⇤ the group of units of A.
Definition 2.32. Let A be a commutative ring, and a, b 2 A. If a|b and b|a, then we say that a
and b are associates.
Definition 2.33. Let A be a commutative ring, and a, b 2 A such that a 6= 0 and b 6= 0. If ab = 0,
then we say that a is a zero divisor.
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Definition 2.34. Let D be a commutative ring. We say D is an integral domain if D has the
following properties:
1. 0 6= 1. That is, the additive identity does not equal the multiplicative identity.
2. D has no zero divisors. That is, 8a, b 2 A such that a 6= 0 and b 6= 0, then ab 6= 0.
Definition 2.35. Let D be an integral domain. If every ideal of D is a principal ideal, then we say
that D is a principal ideal domain (PID).
Definition 2.36. Let D be an integral domain and p 2 D. We say that p is prime if p has the
following properties:
1. p is neither zero nor a unit.
2. 8a, b 2 D such that p|ab, then either p|a or p|b.
Definition 2.37. Let D be an integral domain and p 2 D. We say that p is irreducible if p has
the following properties:
1. p is neither zero nor a unit.
2. 8a, b 2 D such that p = ab, then either a or b is an associate of p, and the other is a unit.
The following theorem is an extremely important result in ring theory that has a multitude of
applications to abstract algebra. We will not prove this result, since the reader is not assumed to
possess a su cient level of mathematical sophistication in order to comprehend the proof.
Theorem 2.38. Let D be a PID and p 2 D. Then, TFAE:
1. p is prime.
2. p is irreducible.
3. (p) is a maximal ideal of D.
4. D/(p) is a field.
5. D/(p) is an integral domain.
We will soon see an important application of this result when we prove that Zp is a finite field for
each prime integer p. Next, the concept of ring homomorphisms, isomorphisms, and automorphisms
is central to the study of ring theory. However, we will not go into much depth of those topics here
since our discussion is tailored towards the theory necessary to understand public key cryptography.
So, we will simply present their definitions below.
Definition 2.39. Let A, B be commutative rings and   : A ! B be a mapping from A to B. Then,
we say that   is a ring homomorphism if   has the following properties:
1. 8a1, a2 2 A,  (a1 + a2) =  (a1) +  (a2).
2. 8a1, a2 2 A,  (a1a2) =  (a1) (a2).
We say that   preserves the operations of addition and multiplication.
Definition 2.40. Let A, B be commutative rings and   : A ! B be a ring homomorphism. If   is
a bijection, then we say that   is an isomorphism of rings. We write A ⇠= B.
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Definition 2.41. Let A be a commutative ring and   : A ! A be an isomorphism of rings. Then,
we say that   is an automorphism of A.
Now, we will introduce some basic concepts of field theory.
Definition 2.42. A field is a commutative ring K such that 8a 2 K with a 6= 0, then 9 a 1 2 K
such that aa 1 = a 1a = 1. We say that a 1 is the multiplicative inverse of a.
Definition 2.43. Let K be a field with a finite number of elements. Then, we say that K is a finite
field.
Now, we will prove that the commutative ring Zp, for each prime integer p, is in fact a field.
First, we note the following results which we will not prove.
Proposition 2.44. Z is a PID.
Proposition 2.45. Let n 2 Z 2. Then, Z/(n) ⇠= Zn.
Now that we have those previous results, we will prove that Zp is a field.
Proposition 2.46. Let p 2 Z be prime. Then, Zp is a field.
Proof. By proposition 2.44, Z is a PID. Since p 2 Z is prime, then by theorem 2.38, Z/(p) is a
field. Since by proposition 2.45, Z/(p) ⇠= Zp, then Zp too is a field. ⌅
It can be shown that every finite field has size pn, for some positive prime integer p and some
positive integer n. Furthermore, every finite field of size pn is isomorphic to Zp[x]/(xn + . . . + 1),
where (xn + . . .+ 1) denotes the ideal generated by an irreducible polynomial of degree n over Zp.
Hence, there exists exactly 1 finite field of size pn isomorphic to Zp[x]/(xn + . . . + 1). We denote
the finite field of size pn by Fp[x]/(xn + . . . + 1). With much more field theory that is beyond the
scope of this discussion, it can be shown that Fp[x]/(xn + . . . + 1) is a finite, separable, splitting,
and hence normal (or Galois), extension field of Fp. As such, we also denote Fp[x]/(xn + . . .+1) by
Fpn or GF (pn), where GF stands for Galois field.
2.4 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is a form of public key cryptography that is based on the algebraic
properties of a type of geometric curve called an elliptic curve (EC). ECC has applications to
symmetric key agreement and digital signature schemes. We’ll see that ECC is popular because it
allows for shorter keys than alternative public key cryptosystems for the same level of security.
Definition 2.47. Let K be a field. An elliptic curve is a geometric curve of the form y2+a1xy+
a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6, each ai 2 K, and a 0-point located at infinity.
We can define the operation of addition on the points on an elliptic curve over some field K. Let
K be a field, E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x + a6 be an E.C. over K, P = (x1, y1), Q =
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(x2, y2) 2 E(K). We will find P +Q 2 E(K). The rule is that the points on any line that intersects
E sum to 0.
Case I: P 6= Q. The line l through P and Q is determined. Then, l intersects E at a third point
S = (x3, y3) 2 E(K), and so
P +Q+ S = 0






l : y   y1 = m(x  x1)y = mx+ y1  mx1. (2.1)
We have
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6
(mx+ y1  mx1)2 + a1x(mx+ y1  mx1) + a3(mx+ y1  mx1) = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6
m2x2 + 2my1x  2m2x1x+ y21   2y1mx1 +m2x21 + a1mx2 + a1y1x  a1mx1 + a3mx+ a3y   a3mx1
= x3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6
x3 + x2( m  a1m+ a2) + x( 2my1 + 2m2x1   a1y1   a3m+ a4)+
( y21 + 2y1mx1  m2x21 + a1mx1   a3y + a3y + a3mx1 + a6) = 0 (2.2)
Since we know that x1 and x2 are roots of (2.2), then we know that (x   x1)(x   x2) = x2 +
x( x1   x2) + x1x2 | (2.2). Polynomial division shows that
(2.2)
x2 + x( x1   x2) + x1x2




2   a1m  a2   x1   x2. (2.3)
Substituting (2.3) into (2.1), we get
y3 = m(m
2   a1m  a2   x1   x2) + y1  mx1
y3 = m
3 +m2( a1) +m( a2   2x1   x2) + y1. (2.4)
Now, we wish to compute P+Q =  S =  (x3, y3). By examining E, and applying the quadratic




(a1x)2   4( x3   a2x2   a4x3   a6)
2
. (2.5)







= y3. Then, S = (x3, y
0
), and so P +Q =  S = (x3, y
00
).
Case II: P = Q. Then, we consider the line tangent to E at P . It must intersect E at a third
point T = (x4, y4) 2 E(K). Then, we have
P + P + T = 0
2P =  T.
We will find an equation for the line tangent to E at P . Using implicit di↵erentiation, we have
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6





3x2 + 2a2x+ a4   a1y








3x21 + 2a2x1 + a4   a1y1
2y1 + a1x1 + a3
. (2.6)
Then,
y   y1 = x(x  x1)y = mx mx1 + y1. (2.7)
By substituting (2.6) into (2.7), we have the line tangent to E at P . Similarly, by substituting
(2.7) into E and dividing by (x  x1)(x  x4) = x2 + x( x1   x4) + x1x4, we get
x4 =  2x1   a2 +m2 + a1m. (2.8)
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By substituting (2.8) into (2.7), we get
y4 = m
3 +m2a1 +m( 3x1   a2) + y1. (2.9)
So, T = (x4, y4). Then, we can use a similar method to case I to find 2P =  T =  (x4, y4).
In general, let R 2 E(K) and n 2 Z>0. Then, we can compute nR = (n  1)R+R.
We can show that E(K) is a group under point addition, with the 0-point as the group identity,
and  (x, y) as the inverse element 8(x, y) 2 E(K). With much more abstract algebra and algebraic
geometry, we can show that E(Fp) = hSi, for some finite field Fp where p is a positive prime integer,
and some S 2 E(Fp).
We will state the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) without proof. This
result beautifully combines the theory of groups, fields, and elliptic curves, and will allow us to
construct several important public key cryptosystems.
Proposition 2.48. (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem). Let E be an E.C. over Fp, p ⇡
2256 2 Z>0 is prime, S 2 E(Fp) generates E(Fp), and T = nS 2 E(Fp), n 2 Z. Then, it is
impractical to determine n from T .
2.5 Elliptic Curve Di e-Hellman
The Elliptic Curve Di e-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm is a public key cryptosystem used for sym-
metric key agreement. It is an ECC analogue of the Finite Field Di e-Hellman algorithm. Alice
(A) and Bob (B) wish to agree on a symmetric key for a symmetric key cryptosystem. A chooses
the EC E over a field Fp, p 2 Z>=2 is prime, S 2 E(Fp) such that E(Fp) = hSi, and aA 2 Z such
that 1 < aA < |E(Fp)|. aA is A’s private key. A then computes her public key aAS = T 2 E(Fp).
A sends E, p, S, and T to B. B chooses his private key aB 2 Z such that 1 < aB < |E(Fp)|,
and computes his public key aBS = U 2 E(Fp). B sends U to A. Then, A computes aAU and B
computes aBT . Since Z is a commutative ring, then the multiplication is commutative for Z, and
so aAaB = aBaA. So, aAU = aAaBS = aBaAS = aBT , meaning A and B have now agreed on the
symmetric key aAaBS 2 E(Fp). If Eve, a third party, intercepts either of the public keys T = aAS
or U = aBS, then by Proposition 2.48, Eve cannot compute either of the private keys aA or aB , and
hence cannot determine the shared symmetric key aAaBS.
2.6 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is a public key cryptosystem used for
digital signatures. It is an ECC analogue of the Finite Field Digital Signature Algorithm. First, we
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will prove a simple result that is important to the ECDSA.
Proposition 2.49. Let G be a finite group, n = |G| 2 Z>0, a 2 G, and l,m 2 Z. If l ⌘ m(mod n),
then al = am.
Proof. Since l ⌘ m(mod n), then n | l  m, and so l  m = nk, k 2 Z. Then,
al m = ank.










Now, we will describe the ECDSA. Alice (A) sends Bob (B) a message, and B wants to be assured
of the integrity and authenticity of the message. That is, B wants to verify that the message has not
been tampered with by Eve during transmission, and that A was the entity that sent the message.
A computes the hash H 2 Z of the message. Then, A chooses the EC E over a field Fp, p 2 Z>=2 is
prime, S 2 E(Fp) such that E(Fp) = hSi, and aA 2 Z such that 1 < aA < |E(Fp)|. aA is A’s private
key. A then computes her public key aAS = (xA, yA) 2 E(Fp). Let n = |E(Fp)|. Next, A chooses a
random session key k 2 Z such that 1 << k << n, and computes kS = (xk, yk). A solves the linear
modular equation
kx ⌘ H + aAxk(mod n) (2.10)
for x. A sends E, p, S, her public key aAS, and her digital signature {kS, x} to B. B computes
the hash H
0 2 Z of the initial message he received from A. Since kx ⌘ H + aAxk(mod n), then
by Proposition 2.49, kxS = (H + aAxk)S = HS + aAxkS. Let HS = (xH , yH). B computes
H
0
S = (xH0 , yH0 ). Since, kxS = xkS = x(xk, yk), and aAxkS = xkaAS = xk(xA, yA), then B
computes xxk and xkxA, and verifies that xxk = xH0 + xkxA. If Eve intercepts E, p, S, aAS, or
{kS, x}, then by Proposition 2.48, Eve cannot determine A’s private key aA. So, only A knows A’s
private key aA, meaning only A could have solved 2.10 for x and signed the hash of the message.
So, B is assured of the authenticity of the message.
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2.7 Webs of Trust
A web of trust is a mechanism to enforce key authentication in a decentralized system. There is no
centralized authority that issues and signs certificates. Instead, each actor in the system certifies
others’ certificates, which builds a directed graph of key authentication relationships.
Definition 2.50. A web of trust is a directed graph G such that each vertex v 2 V (G) denotes a
node in a network, and 9 an edge (u,w) 2 E(G) if and only if u certifies the legitimacy of w’s public
keys.
Each actor in the web of trust has a document that contains information about the authentication
relationships. This document is called a public key ring (PKR). The public key ring for node ai
contains the following fields:
• Identifier for ai.
• Identity of node with which relationship is established.
• A boolean that represents the direction of the relationship (i.e.: 0 denotes ai certifying another
node, 1 denotes another node certifying ai).
• A digital signature of the hash value of a certificate belonging to the node that is being certified.
• A trust value on the node being certified for the action of certifying other nodes.
Let W be a web of trust, V (W ) be the vertex set of W , E(W ) be the edge set of W, and
u,w 2 V (W ). Suppose that u wishes to certify w’s public keys. u requests w’s certificate. The
certificate contains the hash of its contents. u computes the hash of the certificate and verifies that
it matches the value published on the certificate. Then, u encrypts the hash of the certificate with
a digital signature. u writes the digital signature and its trust value on w to certify other nodes
to its PKR. u sends this record in its PKR to w, who adds it to its PKR, modifying the identifier,
identity, and boolean fields appropriately. The process of authentication using a web of trust will
be discussed in our proposed authentication scheme.
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Chapter 3
Introduction to Digital Trust
We begin this discussion of the theory of digital trust with a survey of some basic facts from Govindan
[2]. Digital trust has theoretical foundations in probability theory. We cite several results from Feller
[1].
3.1 Basic Facts
Definition 3.1. Let A, B be entities, and act be some fixed action. Digital trust is a function of
the probability that A believes B will or will not perform act.
Definition 3.2. Let A, B be entities, and act be some fixed action. A trust model is a method of
quantifying the trust of A on whether B will or will not perform act.
Below we define several axioms of digital trust.
Axiom 3.3. Trust is a relationship established between two entities for a specific action. Let A, B
be entities, and act be some fixed action. We denote the trust relationship established from A to B
regarding act by {A : B, act}. We say A is the subject and B is the agent.
Axiom 3.4. Trust is a function of uncertainty. If the subject believes the agent will certainly
perform the action, then we say the subject fully trusts the agent to perform the action, and there is
no uncertainty. If the subject believes the agent will certainly not perform the action, then we say
the subject fully distrusts the agent to perform the action, and there is no uncertainty. If the subject
does not know whether the agent will or will not perform the action, then the subject has the highest
uncertainty.
Axiom 3.5. Let A, B be entities, act be some fixed action, and TA,B 2 R be the trust value for
the relationship {A : B, act}. We write TA,B = {A : B, act}.
Axiom 3.6. Trust relations are not necessarily symmetric. That is, let A, B be entities, act be
some fixed action, and TA,B , TB,A 2 R be the trust values for the relationship {A : B, act} and
{B : A, act}, respectively. Then, TA,B does not necessarily equal TB,A.
Axiom 3.7. Trust can can be established through direct observation of a node’s behavior over time.
Such a trust model is called a direct trust model. Alternatively, trust can be established with a
recommendation. Let A, B, C are entities, and act is some fixed action. Suppose A wishes to
establish trust on C, and B has already established trust on C. Then, A can establish trust on C as
a function of B’s trust on C and A’s trust on B to supply a recommendation.
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3.2 A Direct Trust Model
Josang [3] proposes a trust model based on a probabilistic continuous Beta distribution. Since an
assumption of this model is that the subject has observed a finite number of trials of the agent’s
behavior, we can adapt this model to serve as a direct trust model. Also, we can use the statistical
concept of Bayesian inference in order to iteratively update the subject’s trust value on the agent
after observing more recent data sets of trials.
3.2.1 Bayesian Inference
Bayesian inference is a method of statistical inference that provides a way to combine new evidence
with prior history, through the application of Bayes’ Theorem. We will see that after observing new
evidence, the original posterior probability can be treated as the new prior probability, and the new
posterior probability can be computed as a function of the previous data and the new data. So, we
can apply this method iteratively in order to repeatedly refine the results of our previously collected
evidence.
Let X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} be a set of previously observed data, x̃ be a new data point whose
distribution is to be predicted, ✓ be a parameter of the distribution of x̃, and ↵ be the hyperparameter
of ✓.
Definition 3.8. The prior distribution is the distribution of the parameter before any data is
observed.
The prior distribution of ✓ describes P (✓|↵). The hyperparameter ↵ is the parameter of the prior
distribution.
Definition 3.9. The sampling distribution, or likelihood, is the distribution of the observed data,
dependent on its parameter.
The sampling distribution, or likelihood, of X describes P (X|✓).
Definition 3.10. The marginal likelihood, or evidence, is the distribution of the observed data
marginalized over the parameters.
The marginal likelihood, or evidence, of X describes P (X|↵). We have
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P (X|↵) = P (X \ ↵)
P (↵)




P (X \ ↵ \ ✓)d✓
P (↵)




P (X|↵ \ ✓)P (↵ \ ✓)d✓
P (↵)




P (X|↵ \ ✓)P (✓|↵)P (↵)d✓
P (↵)














P (X|✓)P (✓|↵)d✓, since ↵ is assumed to be fixed.
Definition 3.11. The posterior distribution is the distribution of the parameters after observing
the data.
We have
P (✓|X \ ↵) = P (X \ ↵|✓)P (✓)
P (X \ ↵) , by Bayes’ Theorem.
P (✓|X \ ↵) = P (X|✓)P (↵|✓)P (✓)
P (X)P (↵)
P (✓|X \ ↵) = P (X|✓)P (✓|↵)
P (X)
P (✓|X \ ↵) = P (X|✓)P (✓|↵)
P (X|↵)




The beta distribution is a family of continuous probability distributions defined on the real interval
[0, 1], with parameters ↵,  2 R>0. We say that ↵ and   are the shape parameters of the beta
distribution. We will see that the shape of the curve of the probability density function of the
beta distribution is determined by ↵ and  . The probability density function (PDF) of the beta
distribution is
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3.2.3 Beta Direct Trust Model
Let the agent’s behavior be a random variable X 2 Z2 that follows a Beta distribution such that
X = 1 if the agent performs the action, and X = 0 if the agent does not perform the action.
Assume we can make independent successive observations of X. Let ✓ = P (X = 1) 2 [0, 1], and
1  ✓ = P (X = 0) 2 [0, 1]. Then, we can model X as a sequence of Bernoulli trials with constant
single-trial probability of success ✓. Indeed, ✓ follows a continuous Binomial distribution. Suppose





✓k(1   ✓)n k = P (X = k Successes |✓).
Then, we have































= P (✓ = y|↵ \  ).
So, ✓ is a continuous random variable that follows a Beta distribution. Then, we define the trust
value T 2 [0, 1] as follows:











Now, we will apply the method of Bayesian inference. We have
P (✓ = y|X = k successes of n trials \ ↵ \  ) = likelihoodxprior
evidence
=
P (X = k successes of n trials |✓ = y)P (✓ = y|↵ \  )












































B(↵+ k,  + n  k) .
So, we have a new beta distribution with parameters ↵ + k and   + n   k. We can apply
this method iteratively by letting the posterior distribution for the previous data become the prior
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Figure 3.1: Concatenation propagation of trust.
distribution for the new data. That is, by letting the parameters ↵i+1 = ↵i+k and  i+1 =  i+n k.
We initialize the parameters of the beta distribution to ↵1 =  1 = 1, and so our initial trust value




2 , which represents complete uncertainty.
3.3 An Indirect Trust Model
Sun [6] provides a probabilistic indirect trust model. Throughout the course of this discussion, the
trust value TA,B = {A : B, act} equals the probability pA,B = P (A believes B will perform act).
We will discuss the concatenation propagation and multi-path propagation of trust, and propose a
model for the general case of indirect trust establishment through a system of recommendations.
3.3.1 Concatenation Propagation
Consider the following scenario described by Figure 3.1: A wishes to establish trust on C regarding
act. B has already established trust on C regarding act. A requests a recommendation from B
regarding C’s behavior.
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Let pA,B denote P (B providing a good recommendation), pB,C denote P (B believes C will
perform act), and pA,C denote P (A believes C will perform act). Let p
0
B denote P (B makes correct
recommendation), p
0
C | B = 1 denote P (C performs act if B makes a good recommendation), and
p
0
C | B = 0 denote P (C performs act if B makes a bad recommendation). We can represent actions
as probabilistic events. Let event X denote C performing act and event Y denote B providing a
good recommendation. Clearly, X is dependent on Y . Then,
pA,C = P (Y \X) [ P (Ȳ \X)









C | B = 0
pA,C = pA,BpB,C + (1  pA,B)p
0
C | B = 0
Sun provides the following argument to further simply pA,C . In the following discussion, assume
that each trust value T 2 [ 1, 1] such that T =  1 corresponds to probability p = 0, T = 0
corresponds to probability p = 12 , and T = 1 corresponds to probability p = 1.
Axiom 3.12. Concatenation propagation does not increase trust. That is, let A, B, C be entities
and suppose A wishes to establish trust on C regarding act, B has already established trust on C
regarding act, and A requests a recommendation from B for C. Let TA,B denote {A : B, make
recommendations}, TB,C denote {B : C, act}, and TA,C denote {A : C, act}. Then, |TA,C | 
min{|TA,B |, |TB,C |}.
If TA,B = 0, then by Axiom 3.12, we have |TA,C |  min{0, |TB,C |}. Since |TB,C |   0, then
min{0, |TB,C |} = 0, and so |TA,C |  0. By definition, |TA,C |   0. Hence, |TA,C | = 0, which
corresponds probability pA,C =
1
2 . We have
pA,C = pA,BpB,C + (1  pA,B)p
0






















C | B = 0
1 = pB,C + p
0
C | B = 0
p
0
C | B = 0 = 1  pB,C
Thus,
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Figure 3.2: Simple multi-path propagation of trust.
pA,C = pA,BpB,C + (1  pA,B)(1  pB,C)
Now, we return to our original coordinates of trust values (that is, the trust value TA,B = {A :
B, act} equals the probability pA,B = P (A believes B will perform act)). This is okay since it’s just
a matter of finding a bijection from the coordinates of the probability values to those of the trust
values. Sun provides such a bijection.
Proposition 3.13. pA,C = pA,BpB,C + (1   pA,B)(1   pB,C).
3.3.2 Multi-Path Propagation
Consider the scenario in Figure 3.2. A receives independent recommendations from B and D regard-
ing C’s behavior.







We generalize this approach as described in Figure 3.3.
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pBi,j ,Bi,j+1)pBi,mi ,C + (1  pA,Bi,1)(
mi 1Y
j=1
(1  pBi,j ,Bi,j+1))(1  pBi,mi ,C),












Let c = pA,C1 pA,C 2 R. Then,
pA,C = c(1  pA,C)
pA,C = c  cpA.C
pA,C + cpA.C = c





Proposition 3.14. pA,C =
c











An Authentication Scheme for
MANETs
Let M be a graph representing a MANET and V (M) = {a1, a2, . . . , an} be the vertex set of M (that
is, the set of nodes in M). Suppose the nodes of M have established a web of trust with the trust
value corresponding the the trust relationship Ti,j = {ai : aj , certifying other nodes’ certificates}.
We will describe a scheme to perform the following actions:
1. Authenticate a node in the web of trust.
2. Establish the trust relationship Ti,j .
4.1 Authenticating a Node in the Web of Trust
Let ai, aj 2 V (M). Suppose that ai wishes to send a message to aj . First, ai must authenticate aj .
If aj is in ai’s PKR, then ai trusts the legitimacy of aj ’s public keys, and so ai can send the message
to aj . Otherwise, if aj is not in ai’s PKR, then ai performs a depth-first search on the web of trust
graph to find all paths to aj . Consider the set S of all paths from ai to aj , and consider some path
P = {eb1=ai,b2 , eb2,b3 , . . . , ebm 1,bm=aj} 2 S such that each bk 2 V (M). In order to authenticate
aj , ai must verify each signature in P , and also compute the trust concatenation propagation by
Proposition 3.13. So, ai performs the following steps:
Procedure 4.1.
1: T1 := ai’s trust value for b2 to certify other nodes.
2: T2 := 1  T1
3: PK := ai’s public key
4: for k := 2 to m  1 do
5: ai looks up C := bk’s certificate
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6: ai computes H :=HASH(C)
7: ai requests R := bk’s PKR
8: ai decrypts bk 1’s signature S in R by computing V := Verify(S, PK)
9: if V does not equal H then
10: Mark P as invalid
11: Finished
12: end if
13: T 0 := bk’s trust value for bk+1 to certify other nodes in R
14: T1 := T1T 0
15: T2 := T2(1  T 0)
16: if T1 + T2 < Tth then
17: Mark P as invalid
18: Finished
19: end if
20: PK := bk’s public key in C
21: end for
22: ai computes the concatenation propagation TP = T1 + T2 for P .
After the concatenation propagation has been computed for all paths in S, then ai computes
the multi-path propagation T by Proposition 3.14. If T > Tth, then ai trusts the legitimacy of
aj ’s public keys, and so ai can send the message to aj . We use the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) for a symmetric key cryptosystem, the Elliptic Curve Di e-Hellman algorithm for symmetric
key agreement, the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm for digital signatures, and MD5 for
a hash algorithm. First, ai and aj execute ECDH to agree on a symmetric key. Then, ai encrypts
the message with AES and the symmetric key. Next, ai computes the hash of the message with
MD5, and encrypts the hash with a digital signature using ECDSA. Finally, ai sends the encrypted
message and digital signature to aj , which then decrypts the message to plaintext, and verifies that
the decrypted digital signature matches its computed hash value of the decrypted message. Then,
aj is assured of the integrity and authentication of the message. That is, aj knows that Eve didn’t
tamper with the message during transmission, and that the message originated from ai.
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Figure 4.1: Certifying a node’s certificate.
4.2 Certifying a Node in the Network
Now, suppose ai wishes to certify aj . That is, ai wishes to add a record for aj to ai’s PKR. First, ai
authenticates aj ’s public keys by Procedure 4.1. Upon successful authentication of aj ’s public keys,
ai will compute the trust value for aj to certify other nodes through direct observation by using
the Beta trust model. Then, ai can sign the hash of aj ’s certificate, and add the new record to ai’s
PKR. ai can update this trust value over time after observing further behavior of aj . This process
is described by the flow chart in Figure 4.1.
After establishing trust indirectly on aj , if ai wishes to maintain the trust on aj , then ai imple-
ments the direct observation approach. Initially, ai’s trust on aj should be a function of both the
indirect trust value and the direct trust value. However, over time, ai will want its trust value on
aj to be weighted more towards that from its direct observation versus recommendations. So, we





where Rai,aj , Dai,aj 2 [0, 1] are the trust values established through recommendations direct
observation, respectively,   2 (0, 1) is the remembering factor, tc is the current time, and tr is the
time at which the recommendation trust value was established. Initially, tc   tr ⇡ 0. Over time,














which is the arithmetic mean of Rai,aj and Dai,aj . This makes sense since initially we want Rai,aj
to have a larger weight than it will later in time. But, we want Dai,aj to also have a significant










This makes sense since eventually, the recommendation trust value becomes outdated, and we
want ai’s direct observations to have more weight. As described in Figure 4.1, we can use the Beta
direct trust model to iteratively update Dai,aj over time.
4.3 Attacks on MANETs
We will discuss two prominent attacks on distributed systems. The Sybil attack results when a
malicious node forges the identity of another node which shares or takes the blame of the malicious
actions from the original node. The newcomer attack results when a malicious node leaves the
network and re-registers as a new node, e↵ectively erasing its previous bad history. Both of these
attacks can be addressed with an authentication scheme.
The defense against the Sybil attack involves making it more di cult for the malicious node to
forge the certificate of a new node. Our authentication scheme involves a web of trust to enforce key
authentication of nodes. Also, trust is established in the web of trust using a hybrid trust model.
When a node certifies another node, the first node computes an initial trust value on the second node
for the action of certifying other nodes. The initial trust values are established indirectly through
a system of recommendations, and the trust value is then updated after each subsequent set of
observations using the Beta direct trust model. This quantitative approach to trust establishment
provides a higher level of granularity of trust management, since the threshold trust values in the
system can be adjusted over time depending on how strict or forgiving each node in the network
wishes to be. An underlying assumption of webs of trust is that the majority of the nodes are
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benevolent. So, the majority of the nodes will honestly certify and provide recommendations for
other nodes, making it impractical for a node to forge the identities of other nodes and stay in the
network.
The defense against the newcomer attack is a pure authentication problem. For example, the
system may enforce a bijective mapping of identities in the network onto hardware addresses. That
is, a node should only be assigned exactly 1 identity in the network for its fixed hardware address.




We ran some simulations in MATLAB to test our proposed authentication scheme. We chose to
model the Sybil attack in which a malicious node attempts to forge the identity of a new node that
will perform malicious actions to share the blame with the malicious node. Our simulation included
100 nodes, and we varied the total no. of malicious nodes from 10 to 50 in steps of 10. We modeled
the behavior of the Sybil attack by defining the probability that a malicious node performs a bad
action as a function of the total number of malicious nodes. If there are more malicious nodes,
then each node needs to share less of the blame, and so we have a lower probability of a malicious
node performing a bad action. If there are less malicious nodes, then each node needs to share
more of the blame, and we so we have a higher probability of a malicious node performing a bad
action. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show plots of the trust computed by some arbitrary node in the simulated
network on the malicious node performing the attack and the resulting forged node, respectively,
versus the total number of malicious nodes. In both cases, as there are more malicious nodes in
the network, then each malicious node needs to share less of the blame, and so each can achieve a
higher trust value. However, after applying our authentication and trust scheme, we can see that
the trust values for both nodes are < 0.6 when the number of malicious nodes is < 12 of the total
nodes in the network. Since an underlying assumption of webs of trust is that the majority of the
nodes are benevolent, then these trust values seem reasonable. In this case, a threshold trust value
  0.6 seems appropriate.
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Figure 5.1: Trust on a malicious node vs. total no. of malicious nodes.
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Figure 5.2: Trust on a forged node vs. total no. of malicious nodes.
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Chapter 6
Software Design and Architecture
6.1 Requirements
Functional:
• The system will implement a trust model that supplies accurate trust data to an authentication
mechanism to authenticate nodes in a distributed mobile ad hoc network.
• The iOS application will be able to discover and view all devices in the network.
• The system will allow the user to select a node in the network with which he or she wishes to
communicate.
• Upon successful authentication of that node, the user will be able to view files on that authen-
ticated device.
• The web application will model the trust values and relationships between all nodes in the
network which will allow people to analyze it.
Non-functional:
• The system will implement a direct/indirect hybrid trust model that balances accuracy of trust
data and performance overhead.
• The system will implement a PGP-style web of trust as an authentication mechanism to
authenticate nodes in the distributed network.
• To simulate a network, the system will store a list of simulated devices as well as their trust
values in a database. Once a device enters the network, it pulls those values to use for
calculation locally.
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• The iOS application will support the distribution of text files.
• The iOS application will perform the symmetric key agreement with the Elliptic Curve Di e-
Hellman (ECDH) public key cryptosystem.
• The system will perform the authentication with the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA).
• The web aplication will present the trust values and relationships between nodes in a graphical
format where the vertices represent devices and edges represent trust values.
• The system will enforce ease-of-use through its user interface.
Design constraints:
• The file-sharing component of the system will will be a mobile iOS application.
• The data visualization component of the system will be a web application.
• The iOS application will be compatible with any version over iOS 10.0.
• The web application will be compatible with Safari and Chrome.
6.2 Use Cases
iOS application
User connects to another device
• Preconditions
– Application is opened
– User is connected to WiFi
– Devices are listed
• Postconditions
– User will be connected with the target device
• Exceptions
– User does not have an Internet connection
– The connection is not secure
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User reads files from another device in the network
• Preconditions
– Device has established a secure connection to another device
• Postconditions
– User successfully reads files from destination
• Exceptions
– Low or unsteady wireless connection
Web application
User views the trust graph
• Preconditions
– Application has been opened
– User has an Internet connection
• Postconditions
– User is able to view the trust graph and interact with nodes and edges
• Exceptions
– No Internet connection
6.3 Technologies Used
• C is the implementation language for our back-end cryptographic implementations, which
include the trust model, web of trust, and the AES, ECDH, ECDSA, and MD5 algorithms.
• Cryptlib is a free C cryptography toolkit that provides security services such as data en-
cryption, symmetric key agreement, authentication, message integrity, timestamping, and se-
cret/symmetric and public key management algorithms and protocols.
• Objective-C is our implementation language for the front-end of the iOS mobile application.
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• Cocoa Touch is the set of frameworks that compose the iOS software development kit. It
mainly provides the user interface graphical drawing services for the front-end component of
the application.
• PHP is a widely used scripting language which is suited for server side web development. It
will be used for interacting with the database and sending the required information to the iOS
application and the web application.
• MySQL is a popular open sourced relational database management system. It will be used in
order to make direct calls as well as manage trust values and node data in the system.
• Javascript is a standard multi-paradigm programming language that we will use implement
our web front-end component.
• D3.js is a Javascript library for manipulating documents and data visualization. We will use
D3.js to present in the front-end the data collected by our web component.
• Git is a version control system that promotes integration and non-linearity and software design.
It will enable us to work in parallel while maintaining a continuous master version of our
solution.
6.4 Design Rationale
• Objective-C and Cocoa Touch are the standard iOS development technologies.
• We chose C as our back-end implementation language because it is interoperable with Objective-
C and because its runtime environment will provide e cient execution of our cryptographic
implementations.
• Cryptlib is an extremely popular, e cient, and extensible cryptography and security toolkit
that implements AES, ECDH, ECDSA, and MD5.
• We chose PHP because it is a well ingrained standard in server-side development. Since PHP
is already installed on the SCU Design Center and our team has prior experience, we are
choosing to use it.
• We chose MySQL because it is a popular standard for database management, installed on the
SCU Design Center and a technology that our group is already familiar with.
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• D3.js is a popular Javascript framework for data visualization which is why we have used it to
implement the data-visualization component of the web application.
6.5 Test Plan
For developing the web of trust, we conducted unit testing for each module or function after it has
been completed. This made the development process more e cient, and ensured that bugs did not
propagate through the entire system.
For the iOS application and the web application we conducted UI testing. We also conducted
simple black box testing with expected inputs and outputs to make sure that our iOS application
met the functional requirements we had set for it.
6.6 Development Timeline
Our development timeline details our progress for fall, winter and spring quarter, split into roles.
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Figure 6.1: Development Timeline
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6.7 Activity Diagram
Our activity diagram, shown below, consists of two separate modules for our mobile and web appli-
cations.
Figure 6.2: Activity Diagram
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6.8 Architectural Diagrams
The diagrams shown in the below figures describe the architecture of our ad hoc network, iOS
application, and web application, respectively.
Figure 6.3: Network Architecture
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Figure 6.4: iOS Architecture
Figure 6.5: Web Architecture
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6.9 Conceptual Models
The below images are final screen shots of our iOS and web applications, showing potential use
cases.
Figure 6.6: iOS Model
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Figure 6.7: Web Model
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6.10 Risk Analysis
The following figure tabulates the risks we might expect to encounter along our timeline and how
we plan to mitigate these risks.




With the advent of the smartphone, Internet of Things, and many other modern technologies, we
are given many new means of connection and data exchange, but are also exposed to new method
of attack. Thus, it is crucial that the authentication schemes in these MANETs be sound and prop-
erly implemented. Building these technologies securely can several di↵erent societal implications,
including:
7.0.1 Ethical
In many cases, sensitive user data is at risk. Breaches of privacy and personal security can occur if
authentication fails.
7.0.2 Social
In the same vein, these technologies, particularly IoT devices, allow us to connect with peers in
ways that were not possible before. We must be sure that any peer we share data with is properly
authenticated.
7.0.3 Economic
Cryptocurrencies, specifically those that are decentralized, have challenged existing currency systems





Our project builds on the areas of abstract algebra, elliptic curves, public key cryptography, and
digital trust in order to construct an authentication scheme for MANETs based on a hybrid trust
model between the direct and indirect approaches. Our authentication scheme addresses the Sybil
and newcomer attacks on distributed systems. The MATLAB simulations we ran verify the security
of our authentication scheme, and in our example, suggest a threshold trust value of 0.6. Some
future work includes performing more sophisticated MATLAB simulations and investigating several
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